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THE PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMMISSION TASK FORCE REPORT
ON NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE: A CRITIQUE
OF THE APOLOGIA
Irving Lang *
I. Introduction

In an obviously apologetic fashion, manifesting some discomfort, the Report
of the Task Force on Narcotics and Drug Abuse began:
This Commission has not and could not have undertaken to duplicate
the comprehensive study and report on drug abuse so recently completed
by another Presidential Commission. Yet any study of law enforcement
and the administration of criminal justice must of necessity include some
reference to drug abuse and its associated problems. In the course of the
discussion in this chapter, recommendations are made where they seem
dearly advisable. In many instances these recommendations parallel ones
made by the 1963 Commission.'
The President's Commission properly assumed that "drug traffic and abuse
were growing and critical national concerns." 2 It recognized that opiate addiction was widespread, especially in big city ghettos, and that depressant, stimulant,
and hallucinogenic drugs were the subject of increased abuse, particularly by
students. The Commission also mentioned the role of organized crime in narcotic traffic and attempted to discuss the relationship between drug abuse and
other crimes.
Structurally, the Commission broke down its Report into the following
categories: drugs and their regulation, enforcement, drug abuse and crime,
marijuana, treatment, civil commitment, medical practice and addiction, and
education. Four recommendations in the field of enforcement and three recommendations in the field of research and education were made. With regard to
enforcement, the Commission recommended an increase in the staffs of the
Bureau of Customs and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the adoption of state
drug abuse control legislation, the amendment of federal drug abuse control
laws with respect to record-keeping, and the revision of sentencing laws to provide more flexibility. In the area of research and education, the Commission
recommended research with respect to the regulation of drugs, research by the
National Institute of Mental Health on the use of marijuana, and the development of educational materials.
While it is difficult to quarrel with these recommendations, primary attention should focus on what the Commission did not do, the questions to which it
did not address itself in any meaningful fashion, the lack of depth of the Report,
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and, particularly in the enforcement area, the failure to discuss the peculiar
problems of drug enforcement in relation to the major problems facing law
enforcement in general. Drug abuse is more than a combination of police, medical, federal, and state matters. It is, in the deepest sense, a philosophical and
societal problem which must be viewed not only in the light of its manifestations
in the United States but in the rest of the world as well, and in its proper historical perspective.
II.

Drugs-History, Liberty, and Society

Prohibitions against drug abuse are not found in the Ten Commandments,
nor was the possession or sale of narcotic drugs a common law crime. We must
therefore ask these questions: What are the dangers of narcotic and drug abuse
to society and the individual? In light of those dangers, if any, does society
have the right to regulate and control drug use and drug traffic to the point of
imposing penal sanctions for failure to comply with such regulations? Does
society have the right to treat narcotic addicts by means of compulsory commitment and treatment procedures in the absence of any evidence of specific violations of law?
In his essay, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill wrote:
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is selfprotection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not
a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forebear
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right
These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with
'him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him or
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the
conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for
which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."
At first glance, it would seem that Mill's strictures would give solace to
those who maintain that if narcotic addicts choose to destroy themselves by
using drugs, it is a right to which they, as members of a free society, are entitled.
But the nature of narcotic addiction and its history prove otherwise. Physiologically and emotionally the drug process and the drug life create a situation
opposed to the exercise of free will, a dependency and enslavement which nullify
the ability to choose. As was pointed out by Dr. William Park in a study of
drug addiction in China in 1899,
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[o]pium is no respecter of persons. It enslaves everyone who comes under
its influence, be he an Englishman or a Chinese, black or white, young or
old, rich or poor, bond or free, whether he swallows it or smokes it, or
injects it hypodermically, and an overdose of it will kill the prince or the
pauper.4
And as Mill himself said:
But by selling himself for a slave he abdicates his liberty; he.

..

therefore

defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of

allowing him to dispose of himself.... The5 principle of freedom cannot
require that he should be free not to be free.

Secondly, and this is more important in Mill's terms, is the fact that narcotic
addiction does have ramifications beyond the self-destruction of the addict.
Narcotic addiction is a threat not merely to the addict himself but to the fabric
of society in general. It is primarily for this reason that society must be concerned with drug addiction, and it is for this reason that society does have the
right to institute measures such as compulsory civil commitment to protect itself.
As Mr. Richard H. Blum points out in his consultant paper to the Task
Force Report, it is immaterial that there are conflicting studies about whether
or not addicts are involved in violations of the law before or after their addiction.' Narcotic addiction is a contagion that poses a grave societal hazard
whether or not addicts commit crimes to support their habit. The lesson of
history in this regard is clear and uncontradicted. In 1767, the East India
Company, a predecessor to the Mafia in drug trafficking, began exporting
opium from India to China as a revenue-raising device for Her Majesty's government. The use of opium became so widespread in China, and its devastating
effects on the population became so apparent, that in 1820 the Chinese authorities banned its importation. This led to the tragic Opium Wars of the 1840's
and the subsequent English victory opening Chinese boundaries to narcotic
traffic.

In the early 1800's, a pharmacist's assistant separated a substance from
opium and aptly named it "Morphium" after Morpheus, the god of dreams.
During the Civil War, army doctors used this substance so frequently that many
soldiers became addicted. So marked was the increase in morphine addiction
in the United States after the War that it soon became known as the "army
disease." Then the ready availability of opium in patent medicines without
prescription, the development of the hypodermic needle, and the growth of
opium smoking in the West, spread by Chinese who were brought in to help
build railroads, combined to create a situation of epidemic proportions by 1900.
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This problem, however, was confined mainly to the South and primarily involved whites, a high percentage of whom were women.' The development of
heroin (originally proposed as a cure for morphine addiction) greatly increased
the problem, and by the turn of the century it was estimated that there were
more than 200,000 narcotic addicts in the United States. The spread of this
contagion ultimately led to federal legislation: the Food and Drug Act of
1906' and the Harrison Act of 1914.1" Possibly as a result of this legislation,
between 1914 and World War II there was a marked decline in addiction
despite a rapid population growth. During this period, morphine was the most
popular drug. It was only after World War II that heroin addiction started to
become prevalent in our urban areas.
Thus, as was pointed out by Dr. John Ball," we have two quite distinct
patterns of narcotic addiction in the United States. One addiction pattern, the
one of gravest concern, is manifested by young heroin users who come predominantly from large metropolitan centers and often engage in unlawful activities
which are related to their addiction. The other pattern is typified by the middleaged southern white who uses morphine and paregoric, often obtaining his drugs
through quasi-legal means. This second pattern preceded the passage of the
Harrison Act in 1914 and has decreased materially since that time. The point
to be emphasized, however, is that the pre-World War II non-criminal, morphine pattern and the post World War II criminal, heroin pattern were both
legitimate objects of societal concern and action.
The basic premise that drug addiction is a proper matter for general
concern is supported by racial statistics also. There are many who feel that
narcotic addiction, in view of its prevalence in urban ghetto areas, is primarily
a Negro problem. According to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, however, at
the end of 1966 Negroes constituted 50 percent of all addicts in the United
States. Forty-nine percent were white.' 2 Significantly, there has been a steady
decline in newly reported cases of Negro addiction since 1955 and a concomitant
rise in cases of addiction among whites. This is most dramatically illustrated
by the racial composition of the addict group with which we are very concerned
today -the
group composed of those under 21 years of age. In December of
1966, according to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, only 25.2 percent of the
active narcotic addicts under 21 years of age were Negro; 74.6 percent were
white.' 3 While it is recognized that these statistics are in no way complete (and,
indeed, one of the major endeavors in the area of drug abuse must be the obtaining of greater accuracy in statistical reporting), the very fact that law enforcement efforts are, of necessity, centered in the minority group, high crime rate

8 Eugene O'Neill's play, Long Day's Journey into Night, graphically and dramatically
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10 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
11 Ball, Two Patterns of Narcotic Drug Addiction in the United States, J. Ca~m. L.C.
& P.S. 203 (1965).
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areas indicates that teenage white addiction may be even greater than these
4
figures show.'
The conclusion to be drawn with respect to this plethora of racial statistics
is that addiction does not respect racial origin. We delude ourselves if we gear
our educational treatment and enforcement efforts along racial lines alone.
III. Penal Law and Civil Commitment
Accepting the premise that society has the right and, indeed, the obligation
to curb narcotic abuse, the question to be answered is: What forms of intervention are most effective and humane? Clearly, penal sanctions for the possession and sale of narcotic drugs are within the purview of the police power
of the state. As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out in Robinson v. California: "Such regulation, it can be assumed, could take a variety of
valid forms. A State might impose criminal sanctions, for example, against the
unauthorized manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics within its borders."' 5 The use of penal sanctions has been the primary
method of regulation by both the federal government and the states. However,
most persons who are apprehended in connection with violation of narcotic
laws are either users or small-scale sellers. This leads to either the "revolving
door" problem: i.e., a short-term period of incarceration, return to the com
munity, re-arrest, and return to prison for another short term, or inordinately
long jail terms for users who are relatively low on the scale of culpability in
narcotic traffic.
A new type of intervention that is currently emerging adopts a plan of
compulsory commitment for meaningful treatment instead of meaningless incarceration. The compulsory treatment approach is geared not only to the offender
convicted of a crime but is also directed at the narcotic addict who is not the
subject of criminal charges. This utilization of treatment procedures for convicted offenders and for those arrested addicts who volunteer for such assistance
has received general approbation, with Professor Aronowitz's caveat that no
treatment period should be longer than that allowed for a conviction of the
crime itself.' This outlook reflects a "time syndrome," i.e., any amount of
societal control or management of the life of an individual constitutes "doing
time," whether it be straight jail time or a rehabilitative process.
The problem of involuntary civil commitment where no criminal charges
are pending is an area of primary concern to those who seek to protect civil
liberties. The Task Force did address itself to the pros and cons of civil commitment and concluded:
[Tihe Commission believes that involuntary civil commitment offers sufficient promise to warrant a fair test. But it must not become the civil
14 For example, in the Borough of Queens in New York City, whites constitute most of
the addicts.
15 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
16 This outlook reflects a "time syndrome," i.e., any amount of societal control or management of the life of an individual constitutes "doing time," whether it be straight jail time
or a rehabilitative process.
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equivalent of imprisonment. The programs must offer the best possible
treatment, including new techniques as they become available, and the
duration of the commitment, either within17 or outside an institution, must
be no longer than is reasonably necessary.
This makes good sense. Even if, in Mill's terms, it has been established that
narcotic addiction is a threat not only to the addict but to others, a just and
fair society cannot sanction this extreme remedy unless civil commitment programs are entirely geared to the rehabilitative process. In the Robinson case,
the majority of the Supreme Court declared: "In the interest of discouraging
the violation of such laws, or in the interest of the general health or welfare of
its inhabitants, a State might establish a program of compulsory treatment for
those addicted to narcotics." (Footnote omitted.)'" Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, said: "The addict is a sick person. He may, of course, be confined
for treatment or for the protection of society." (Footnote omitted.)"
I submit that both Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Douglas should
have insisted that the protection of society and the treatment of the addict are
both essential ingredients of a constitutionally feasible treatment program rather
than alternative justifications. Such a view obviously entails the use of flexible
treatment programs geared to the determination of which types of programs
benefit which type of addict. It also involves a constant awareness on the part
of the courts and the administrators of such programs of the nature and quality
of the treatment.
IV.

Other Dangerous Drugs -

Hard and Soft

Comments made about opiates and society's responses to their abuse are
not necessarily valid when made about other dangerous drugs plaguing America
today. Cultivation of opium has been reported as far back as seven centuries
before Christ. Despite many unknowns in this area, there is indeed a large body
of knowledge and historical perspective about opiate abuse. Widespread abuse
of amphetamines, hallucinogens, barbiturates, and tranquilizers, however, is
relatively new and poses fresh problems of understanding, regulation, and control.
It may be said that while opiates are drugs of retreat, hallucinogens and stimulants are drugs of rebellion. We need, as the Commission has pointed out,20
much more data to determine if a similar degree of criminality attends the use
of "soft drugs" as attends heroin abuse. I suspect not. Unlike the case of heroin,
millions of legitimate medical prescriptions are issued every year for stimulants,
depressants, and tranquilizers. Unlike the situation with respect to heroin, there
is evidence to indicate that many people can function on a socially acceptable
level despite use of these drugs. Finally, unlike the opiate situation, it appears
that soft drug abuse is often a phase rather than a long term involvement.

17
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V. A Statutory Guideline
From the empirical data available, it must be concluded that "soft drugs"
are proper subjects of government regulation and control. It is important,
however, that legislation in this area, particularly penal legislation, be selective,
sophisticated, and structured in an intelligent manner. While the Commission,
in discussing this problem, urged "further development of a sound and effective
framework of regulatory and criminal laws with respect to dangerous drugs,"'"
they did not pose specific suggestions. I submit that New York's newly revised
Penal Law2" provides a proper framework for an effective statutory structure.
Article 220 of this law, entitled "Dangerous Drug Offenses," divides dangerous
drugs into four basic categories: narcotic drugs, depressants, stimulants, and
hallucinogenic drugs. It provides varying degrees of penalties for both possession
and sale of these dangerous drugs, but, in general, narcotic drug violations carry
very high penalties, and other dangerous drug violations carry more moderate
penalties. Unfortunately, the definition of narcotic drug in the Penal Law
makes a cross-reference to the definition of narcotic drug in the Public Health
Law,2" which, as in many other states, includes marijuana within its purview.
This creates many problems, one of which is that, as concern with heroin abuse
rises and penalties are increased, penalties for the use of marijuana are increased
concomitantly, which results in what I call "legislative." Such a result is unfortunate since judges, district attorneys, and, indeed, law enforcement officials in
general recognize that marijuana violations do not contain the same measure of
societal threat as heroin violations.2 ' It would be appropriate, therefore, in
devising a regulatory scheme, to place marijuana in the same category as LSD
and other hallucinogens. This also seems logical in view of the frequent cases
of multi-habituation with respect to marijuana and dangerous drugs. Marijuana, for example, is often used in conjunction with amphetamines, LSD, or
peyote. An arrest will often result in the seizure of marijuana and LSD or
marijuana and pep pills. Less frequently, however, is there an arrest where
both marijuana and heroin are seized.
Cocaine is also defined in federal 5 and state 8 law as a narcotic drug. As
the Commission points out, however, cocaine is a stimulant.2" While it is undoubtedly more dangerous than marijuana, I believe that it should be categorized
as a stimulant rather than as a narcotic. This would not necessarily mean that
one would have to modify the penalties for cocaine violations; it simply means
that a legislative body could provide special penalties for its illegal use while
recognizing that it is a stimulant.
By utilizing this type of structure, penal law provisions dealing with the
abuse of dangerous drugs would have both consistency and reasonableness 21

Id. at 6.

22
23
24
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factors often lacking when legislators view such emotionally charged matters.
Finally, it cannot be denied that sentencing for penal law violations is
obviously a basic function of legislative bodies. However, few can quarrel with
the Commission's recommendations that courts be given enough discretion to
enable them to deal flexibly with violators of drug laws rather than being forced
to impose mandatory terms of confinement."
VI. Marijuana
The Commission made a point of commenting specially on marijuana.
The selection of marijuana for special comment is amply justified by the current
furor over its use on college campuses. Marijuana is fast becoming a focal point
for student rebellion and protest against authority. It has created situations
whereby college administrators are torn between their obligation to help students
and their duty to cooperate with law enforcement officials; it has led to cries
for legalization and liberalization and to cries for expulsion and the imposition
of more stringent penal sanctions. The Commission's informative and unbiased
analysis of the situation and its recommendation for more research are welcome,
but again salient considerations are omitted.
The protagonists of marijuana have two basic contentions. First, marijuana,
unlike heroin, does not produce physical dependence nor withdrawal, nor does
it build up tolerance. The Commission recognizes this as true. 9 Secondly, the
protagonists maintain that not only is marijuana not comparable to heroin but,
even more important, it is less dangerous than alcohol which is a far greater
threat to society. Often, those who oppose legalization of marijuana in any
form fall into the trap of attempting to prove that marijuana is, indeed, a far
greater menace than alcohol.
In view of the Commission's discussion on alcohol" and its enormous detrimental impact on the nation, this counter-argument is quite hollow. A more
meaningful response would be to point out that merely because over a long
period of time a tradition has been established whereby consumption of a toxic
substance has been sanctioned in varying degrees on a mass level does not logically
lead to the conclusion that society should release another toxic substance for
mass consumption.
Then too, alcohol is, in fact, one of the most regulated drugs. There are
laws dealing with the licensing of manufacturers, laws dealing with the age at
which purchase is permissible, penal laws prohibiting public intoxication, and
laws creating both penal and administrative penalties for driving under the
influence of alcohol. The latter, of course, is a matter of extreme importance
and an important factor in the death and injury tolls on our highways.
A person driving under the influence of marijuana is as dangerous as a
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person driving under the influence of alcohol." How can society deter driving
under the influence of marijuana? We can, of course, impose the same form
of deterrent as we did with alcohol, that is, making it a criminal offense to drive
under its influence. Theoretically, however, the law does not do vain and foolish
things. Unenforceable statutes should not be passed. With respect to alcohol,
it is relatively easy to prove that a person was driving under its influence. Smelling of alcohol on the breath, visual observation, blood alcohol tests or breath
tests, make successful prosecutions possible. The same cannot be said for marijuana. Proof of driving while under the influence of marijuana would be a virtual
impossibility. Accordingly it may properly be argued that a measured response
is possible in connection with alcohol but if such a limited response is not possible with respect to marijuana at the present time, society has the right to ban
its possession for all purposes.
VII. Law Enforcement
If there is one section of the report where it can be positively asserted that
the Commission failed to come to grips in any meaningful fashion with a significant area, it is in the section on enforcement. If there is any one area of
criminal law in which the recent court decisions relating to search and seizure,
informers, wiretapping, eavesdropping and confessions 2 have particular importance, it is enforcement of narcotic and dangerous drug laws. Such vital areas
as the problem of the proliferation of agencies which deal with this issue, the
cooperation or lack of it among these agencies, the rivalries between and among
these agencies, the need for coordination of criminal intelligence and problems
of proof either were not mentioned at all or tangentially discussed. It is also a
source of concern that the Report of the Arthur D. Little Company which
surveyed the field of law enforcement was not included in the consultants' papers.
This seems to me a grave omission. If one is to discuss law enforcement and
the administration of justice and the area of narcotic and drug abuse, these
issues cannot be avoided. They are not, obviously, easy of resolution. But problems do not disappear by refusing to acknowledge them. The failure to pose
the questions and suggest alternatives casts a pall over the Commission's Report.

31

In this connection it is relevant to point out that there is, generally, no quarrel with

the proposition that the physiological effects of marijuana include altered consciousness and
disturbance of time and space perception. See GOODMAN & GILMAN, THE PHA MACOLOGICAL
BASIS oF THERAPSUTICS 300 (1965).

32 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (wiretapping and eavesdropping);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (eavesdropping); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (interrogation of accused); Beek v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, (1964) (informers);
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964) (informers); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23 (1963) (probable cause); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (search and
seizure-interplay of 4th and 5th amendments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(applicability of 4th amendment to states); Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (police practice in narcotic sale cases); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d
32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964) (stop and frisk).
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VIII. Conclusion ,
The Presidential Commission's agonizing appraisal of the drug problem
was based upon two fundamental assumptions. The first assumption was that
there is a great deal of misinformation and emotionalism involved in the ideas
of the average citizen about drug abuse. The second assumption was that new
approaches have to be made in society's handling of the problem. With respect
to the second assumption, the Commission was obviously unwilling or unable
to analyze the drug problem in sufficient depth or to deal with its underlying
philosophical issues.

